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“A Towering Virtue of Necessity”:
Interdisciplinarity and the Rise of Computer 
Music at Vietnam- Era Stanford
by Cyrus C. M. Mody* and Andrew J. Nelson†
ABSTRACT
Stanford, more than most American universities, transformed in the early Cold War 
into a research powerhouse tied to national security priorities. The budgetary and le-
gitimacy crises that beset the military- industrial- academic research complex in the 
1960s thus struck Stanford so deeply that many feared the university itself might not 
survive. We argue that these crises facilitated the rise of a new kind of interdisciplin-
arity at Stanford, as evidenced in particular by the founding of the university’s com-
puter music center. Focusing on the “multivocal technology” of computer music, 
we investigate the relationships between Stanford’s broader institutional environ-
ment and the interactions among musicians, engineers, administrators, activists, 
and funders in order to explain the emergence of one of the most creative and profi t-
able loci for Stanford’s contributions to industry and the arts.
INTRODUCTION
Stanford University’s CCRMA, or Center for Computer Research in Music and 
Acoustics, enjoys a reputation as a world- class computer music and sound research 
center. CCRMA faculty, staff, and students produce infl uential musical composi-
tions, develop radical and impactful technologies, cultivate dense ties to other depart-
ments and external organizations, and manage an impressive patent portfolio that has 
yielded tens of millions of dollars in licensing revenue. While today such interdis-
ciplinary cooperation between musicians and engineers may be heralded as a laud-
able—if still unusual—combination, such an outcome was hardly preordained at the 
time of CCRMA’s early activities in the 1960s and 1970s.
On one level, this article addresses the simple question, Where did CCRMA come 
from? Our answer to that question, however, unravels a deeper set of issues, couched 
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in Vietnam War– era debates over the role of universities and their relationship to gov-
ernment or military funding. These debates, we argue, formed a milieu out of which 
interdisciplinary programs such as CCRMA could coalesce, acquire fi nancial and 
political resources, and, ultimately, become self- sustaining and deeply integrated 
members of both a university like Stanford and a broad organizational fi eld that com-
bines commercial, academic, artistic, and other activities. We identify specifi c fea-
tures of both the institutional environment at Stanford and the particular research 
conducted at CCRMA that, together, facilitated the center’s emergence and growth. 
We focus specifi cally on pressures toward interdisciplinarity and “relevant” research, 
and argue that CCRMA researchers’ expertise both in the “multivocal technology” of 
audio synthesis and processing and in novel forms of interdisciplinary collaboration 
explains why CCRMA emerged from (and thrived in) this milieu.
Music, science, and engineering were swirling around one another long before the 
late ’60s, as documented by the other chapters in this volume. The core of our argu-
ment, however, is that the confl uence of many different pressures brought on by the 
Southeast Asian confl ict created an environment at Stanford in which these fi elds 
could effectively bind, react, and grow together. Our chapter thus emphasizes the in-
stitutional context surrounding the emergence and growth of computer music at Stan-
ford and the ways in which institutional environments and particular developments at 
the intersection of music, science, and engineering came to be mutually reinforcing.
STANFORD’S TRANSFORMATION IN THE EARLY COLD WAR
The larger context that helped to facilitate CCRMA was the formation (and then, 
in the late 1960s, the sudden undermining) of the national science policy regime 
established in the early Cold War. More than almost any other university, Stanford 
capitalized on post– World War II changes in federal funding and the emergence 
of a military- industrial- academic complex to transform from a sleepy, provincial, 
undergraduate- focused institution into a world- leading research university. Yet that 
transformation came with a price. When the military- industrial- academic complex 
experienced crises of funding and legitimacy in the late 1960s, Stanford’s depen-
dence on that complex meant that it, in turn, saw steep budgetary declines and student 
unrest directed at the university’s researchers and laboratories. To understand the 
environment that facilitated CCRMA’s emergence, therefore, it is necessary to look 
back to the early Cold War.
Many hands contributed to Stanford’s postwar transformation, but no one more 
than Frederick Terman.1 When he became dean of engineering in 1946, Terman be-
gan remolding Stanford to “exploit” the “wonderful opportunity” provided by the 
Cold War expansion in federal research funding.2 Terman largely followed the vision 
for science policy put forward by his mentor, Vannevar Bush, that came to be known 
as the “linear model of innovation.”3 This model presupposed that basic scientifi c re-
1 Material on Terman is drawn largely from Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: 
The Military- Industrial- Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); Rebecca Lowen, 
Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); Eric J. 
Vettel, Biotech: The Countercultural Origins of an Industry (Philadelphia, 2006).
2 Terman, quoted in Lowen, Creating the Cold War University (cit. n. 1), 96.
3 There is a historiographic debate as to whether Bush should be given credit for the linear model, 
and even whether there was such a thing. See Benoît Godin, “The Linear Model of Innovation: The 
Historical Construction of an Analytical Framework,” Science, Technology and Human Values 31 
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search, guided by curiosity and disciplinary conventions and ostensibly uninfl uenced 
by economic gain or societal priorities, would yield generalized, fundamental knowl-
edge that could be applied to specifi c, technological problems. Bush argued that sev-
eral war- winning technologies had had their origins in curiosity- driven fi elds; most 
notably, the atomic bomb was in part made possible by unguided nuclear physics 
research that, before the war, had not seemed to have much relevance to military 
needs. The lesson Bush drew was that the Cold War state needed to invest large sums 
in basic research.4
Similarly, the lesson Terman took from his wartime experiences was “that the 
training of engineers was inadequate, that they didn’t measure up to the needs of 
the war. . . . Most of the major advances in electronics were made by physicists . . . 
rather than by engineers.”5 Thus, back at Stanford, Terman revamped undergraduate 
engineering education to emphasize fundamental math and physics, and brought in 
star researchers who could attract federal funding and graduate students for basic 
engineering science research and who could bring more cutting- edge fundamental 
physics into engineering.
By prioritizing basic research, Terman also satisfi ed the Stanford family’s directive 
that the university aid California industry. Faculty who engaged in applied research 
and development (R&D) of specifi c technologies risked competing with off- campus 
fi rms. By training students in basic research, however, Stanford’s science and engi-
neering departments generated both nonrival knowledge and personnel that fl owed 
easily into the growing local electronics and aerospace sectors.
Terman used both carrot and stick to achieve his vision. In the traditional natural 
science departments, he used his administrative authority to override and isolate re-
calcitrant older faculty who were unwilling to take federal money or were too inter-
ested in teaching undergraduates, or whose research was not reductionist and funda-
mental enough.6 He also pushed natural science departments to focus on subfi elds 
where fundamental research could easily serve high- tech industry and/or where fed-
eral funding was available. Geology, for instance, was steered toward petroleum ge-
ology, and physics toward high- energy accelerator research.7
In cases where change came too slowly, Terman created new hybrid departments, 
such as Applied Physics and Genetics,8 and reinvented old ones (e.g., Metallurgy 
(2006): 639– 67; Philip Mirowski, Science- Mart: Privatizing American Science (Cambridge, Mass., 
2010); David Edgerton, “The ‘Linear Model’ Did Not Exist: Refl ections on the History and Historiog-
raphy of Science and Research in Industry in the Twentieth Century,” in The Science- Industry Nexus: 
History, Policy, Implications, ed. Karl Grandin, Nina Wormbs, and Sven Widmalm (Sagamore Beach, 
Mass., 2004), 31– 57; Glen Ross Asner, “The Cold War and American Industrial Research” (PhD diss., 
Carnegie Mellon Univ., 2006). We are agnostic on this point. We are simply arguing that Bush articu-
lated a justifi cation for investment in basic research that hinged on the possibility that high- tech in-
dustries and militarily signifi cant technologies would arise from that research. Over time, economists 
and policy makers elaborated that justifi cation into what is now known as the linear model—and, over 
time, Terman elaborated his local implementation of Bush’s vision at Stanford to follow suit.
4 This is a tendentious interpretation of the importance of basic research in the Manhattan Project 
and other wartime programs, but one that was widely subscribed to at the time. See Rebecca Press 
Schwartz, “The Making of the History of the Atomic Bomb: Henry DeWolf Smyth and the Historiog-
raphy of the Manhattan Project” (PhD diss., Princeton Univ., 2008).
5 Terman, quoted in Leslie, Cold War and American Science (cit. n. 1), 54.
6 Leslie, Cold War and American Science, 167; Vettel, Biotech, 53– 65 (Both cit. n. 1).
7 Lowen, Creating the Cold War University, 80; Leslie, Cold War and American Science, chap. 6 
(Both cit. n. 1).
8 Leslie, Cold War and American Science, 175– 81; Vettel, Biotech, 65 (Both cit. n. 1).
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became Materials Science9) in order to move methods from ostensibly more basic 
fi elds into more applied disciplines. He and his allies also created a series of non-
departmental research centers to serve as a bridge between university and industry, 
and between basic and applied research. First came the Microwave Laboratory in 
1944, which early on functioned as the on- campus arm of a local start-up, Varian 
Associates.10 Later centers included the Applied Electronics Laboratory, the Sys-
tems Techniques Laboratory, the Solid State Electronics Laboratory, and the Center 
for Materials Research. Though these centers did much fundamental research, their 
funding sources (and the most visible short- term applications of their work) were de-
fense related, and the fi rms to which they had ties were major players in the military- 
industrial complex.
These nondepartmental research centers later provided an important model for 
CCRMA. For instance, several of these centers had industrial affi liates programs 
whereby fi rms could preview faculty research and recruit star students, a feature 
CCRMA later adopted. However, CCRMA was also molded by the backlash in the 
late ’60s against two prominent characteristics of the early Cold War centers. First, 
though (as Stuart Leslie notes) these early centers were “interdisciplinary,” the in-
terdisciplinarity they embodied was often restrictive: methods and knowledge cir-
culated among the physical and engineering sciences (sometimes with the expressed 
aim of making engineering more “scientifi c”), but there was little outreach to eco-
nomics, law, music, English, political science, medicine, and so forth.11 CCRMA, by 
contrast, was founded in—and exemplifi ed—an era when many stakeholders placed 
a much higher value on more wide- ranging and egalitarian interdisciplinarity. Sec-
ond, though these early centers did not avoid civilian funding and applications, their 
fortunes were largely tied to the national security state. Conversely, while CCRMA 
did not actively eschew national security funding and ties to the defense industry, it 
did refl ect local and national calls for societal relevance by pursuing highly visible 
civilian technologies and ties to consumer products fi rms.
The center to which CCRMA was most closely related was the Stanford Artifi -
cial Intelligence Laboratory (SAIL). SAIL’s roots can be traced to 1962, when John 
McCarthy arrived at Stanford and initiated an artifi cial intelligence (AI) project that 
built upon a similar project that he and Marvin Minsky organized at MIT in the late 
1950s. McCarthy received fi nancial support from the Pentagon’s Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA) to fund a group of six people, establishing the Stanford Ar-
tifi cial Intelligence Project in 1963. With further support from ARPA, and bolstered 
by the formation of Stanford’s computer science department in 1965, the “project” 
evolved into a “laboratory” and grew from fi fteen people in 1965 to over one hundred 
by 1968. ARPA continued to provide anywhere from half to two- thirds of the fund-
ing in a given year, with NASA, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health also providing signifi cant support.12
9 Lowen, Creating the Cold War University, 213; Leslie, Cold War and American Science, chap. 8 
(Both cit. n. 1).
10 Leslie, Cold War and American Science (cit. n. 1), chap. 6; Christophe Lécuyer, Making Silicon 
Valley: Innovation and the Growth of High Tech, 1930– 1970 (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), chap. 3.
11 Leslie, “Playing the Education Game to Win: The Military and Interdisciplinary Research at Stan-
ford,” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 18 (1987): 55– 88.
12 Lester Earnest, ed., “Final Report: The First Ten Years of Artifi cial Intelligence Research at Stan-
ford” (Stanford Artifi cial Intelligence Laboratory Memo AIM- 228, July 1973); Bruce G. Buchanan, 
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A 1973 overview of the fi rst ten years of the project reported that “the work of 
the Stanford Artifi cial Intelligence Project has been basic and applied research in 
artifi cial intelligence and closely related fi elds, including computer vision, speech 
recognition, mathematical theory of computation, and control of an artifi cial arm.”13 
In other words, AI provided the underlying raison d’être, but actual applications were 
envisioned in a wide range of fi elds. The diversity of projects was matched by a diver-
sity of political perspectives in the AI group, with McCarthy traversing from left to 
right over the course of the ’60s while his deputy director, Les Earnest, moved in the 
opposite direction.14 In both research outlook and political temperament, therefore, 
SAIL straddled a broad landscape just as the turmoil of the late ’60s began. Its capac-
ity to invite participants holding diverse political and disciplinary perspectives would 
be an important bequest to SAIL’s eventual spin- off, CCRMA.
HISTORY OF THE STANFORD MUSIC DEPARTMENT
The Department of Music followed a rather different trajectory than Stanford’s 
natural, social, and engineering science departments and their associated centers. In 
fact, Stanford did not have a music department until 1946, more than fi fty- fi ve years 
after the university’s founding in 1891. This is not to say that music was not a major 
part of university life from the earliest days. For example, the Stanford Memorial 
Church, which occupies a central position on campus both geographically and (at 
least early on) socially, had an active music program from the start. Yet Stanford’s 
musical activities, such as the band, orchestra, and various glee clubs, were largely 
initiated by students rather than faculty or the administration.15 Formal courses were 
scarce and a degree program did not exist.
Through the university’s fi rst half century, Stanford administrators vacillated as to 
the place of music. In 1926, for instance, then- president Ray Lyman Wilbur wrote 
the board of trustees that “funds may be available for a course in harmony and com-
position as the basis for” the possible formation of “an adequate School of Music 
along the lines of the Yale School of Music,”16 yet no such action was taken. In fact, 
it was alumni who moved forward by forming the Friends of Music at Stanford in the 
mid- 1930s. Finally, in 1946, Stanford created a department of music, the last major 
American university to do so.17
The establishment of a department, however, did not ensure its quality and reputa-
tion. For example, Stanford remained unranked in the 1957 survey conducted by the 
“Introduction to the COMTEX Microfi che Edition of Memos from the Stanford University Artifi cial 
Intelligence Laboratory,” AI Magazine 4 (Winter 1983): 37– 42.
13 Earnest, “Final Report” (cit. n. 12), 2.
14 John Markoff, “Optimism as Artifi cial Intelligence Pioneers Reunite,” New York Times, 8 Dec. 
2009, D4.
15 Orrin Leslie Elliott, Stanford University: The First Twenty- Five Years (1937; repr., New York, 
1977), 198– 9.
16 Wilbur to the Honorable Board of Trustees, Leland Stanford Junior University, memorandum, 
9 Oct. 1926, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, Calif. (hereafter cited as SUA), SC27, box 17, 
folder 5, “Board of Trustees Supporting Documents.”
17 M. Tanner, “A Brief History of the Department of Music” (unpublished manuscript, Stanford, Ca-
lif., 1978); C. Smith, “Gift Enables Music Department to Construct Long- Needed Facility,” Stanford 
Daily, 14 Jan. 1980, 1.
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American Council on Education on quality of graduate faculty in music.18 Moreover, 
Terman’s reorientation of the university toward basic research may have run counter 
to the traditional emphasis on composition and performance—instruction- oriented 
subjects that were core foci of most academic music departments. Other humanistic 
departments, most notably Classics, may have offered Music a gruesome example 
of Terman’s attitude toward what he deemed “impractical fi elds” that could not 
bring in external research funding or connect to high- tech industry: as provost, Ter-
man stripped Classics of faculty lines, shrank its graduate program, and commanded 
that its remaining faculty teach only large, lower- level undergraduate  courses.19 The 
music department, therefore, was in a remarkably ambiguous and indeterminate po-
sition in the mid- 1960s, particularly in comparison to its peer departments at other 
universities. Stanford’s department was still emerging on the national scene, still 
searching out its areas of emphasis, and still uncertain about its place in Terman’s 
university.20 That uncertainty and immaturity made the music department ripe for 
organizational and technological experimentation just as the campus ferment of the 
Vietnam era began.
VIETNAM- ERA CRISES
The unrest that gripped Stanford in the late ’60s and early ’70s was—as on other 
campuses—a product of many deep divisions in American society. But Stanford was 
one of a smaller number of universities—such as MIT and Princeton—where the 
conduct of academic science and engineering was a focus of protest (often in con-
junction with other issues, especially the war).21 Science- based unrest at Stanford co-
alesced gradually, beginning in 1966 with debates about classifi ed research on cam-
pus.22 By the time the administration was forced to terminate its classifi ed contracts 
in 1969, however, protesting students, reformist faculty, and infl uential politicians 
(such as Mike Mansfi eld and Edward Kennedy) had moved on to a much larger goal: 
the reconfi guration of the nation’s—and hence also Stanford’s—research enterprise 
to prioritize solving civilian social problems above generating fundamental knowl-
edge or contributing to national security.
This coalition articulated—with many variations—a vision of academic science 
and engineering primarily funded by civilian agencies and emphasizing applied re-
search deemed relevant to social issues such as pollution, energy, mass transit, public 
housing, and biomedicine. The types of basic research that had been the cornerstone 
of Terman’s Stanford found little favor in the “relevance” agenda. Stanford’s Student 
18 Kenneth D. Roose and Charles J. Andersen, A Rating of Graduate Programs (Washington, D.C., 
1970), 48.
19 Lowen, Creating the Cold War University (cit. n. 1), 159.
20 Andrew J. Nelson, “Cacophony or Harmony? Multivocal Logics and Technology Licensing by 
the Stanford University Department of Music,” Industrial and Corporate Change 14 (2005): 93– 118.
21 Vettel, Biotech (cit. n. 1), chaps. 5– 6; Stuart W. Leslie, “Time of Troubles for the Special Lab-
oratories,” in MIT: Moments of Decision, ed. David Kaiser (Cambridge, Mass., 2011): 123– 44; 
Matthew M. Wisnioski, “Inside ‘the System’: Engineers, Scientists, and the Boundaries of Social Pro-
test in the Long 1960s,” History and Technology 19 (2003): 313– 33; Dorothy Nelkin, The University 
and Military Research: Moral Politics at MIT (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972).
22 Our discussion of the controversies over classifi ed research at Stanford and the Stanford Research 
Institute draws on Leslie, Cold War and American Science (cit. n. 1), chap. 9.
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Radical Caucus, for example, dismissed basic research as “useless.”23 More subtle 
reformists, such as engineering graduate student and activist Stanton Glantz, argued 
that “the notion of ‘basic research’ often acts as a smokescreen to hide what we are 
doing . . . [and] to avoid facing the consequences” of academic research for the con-
fl ict in Southeast Asia.24 Even faculty who had benefi ted from the early Cold War 
accumulation of a basic research stockpile, such as Robert Huggins (director of Stan-
ford’s ARPA- funded Center for Materials Research) were open to the idea that the 
time had come to apply that knowledge to “civilian technologies that have lain com-
paratively dormant in recent years, when primary attention was heavily concentrated 
upon . . . defense- and space- related matters.”25
It is important to note that the deep divisions engendered by calls for relevance 
were not so much about whether academic research should benefi t civil society, but 
how long it should take for that to happen, how directly that translation should be 
guided, and whether military funding hindered that translation. Researchers and ad-
ministrators who were skeptical of the relevance agenda insisted that civilian tech-
nologies would result even from work funded by the military. Moderate reformers 
countered that academic scientists and engineers could and should quicken the pace 
of translation by seeking nonmilitary funding sources and being more attuned to re-
search areas that would fl ow more easily into civilian applications. Radicals, mean-
while, believed urgent action was needed. Students for a Democratic Society and 
other campus activists painted researchers who took defense funding as complicit 
in the Southeast Asian confl ict. In 1969, unrest over Stanford researchers’ ties to the 
military came to a boil, with protesters picketing and chanting outside laboratories, 
setting fi res and stealing classifi ed information, pouring paint on President Kenneth 
Pitzer, staging a nine- day takeover of the Applied Electronics Laboratory (AEL) and 
the Systems Techniques Laboratory (STL), and more.26
RADICAL INTERDISCIPLINARITY AS A SOLUTION
The AEL/ STL takeover and other confrontations contributed to CCRMA’s founding 
in part by generating a pervasive anxiety about, as Glantz put it, “the possibility of vio-
lent confrontation between Stanford’s technical and non- technical communities.”27 
In response, many students, faculty, and administrators articulated the hope that 
greater cross- disciplinary understanding and collaboration would foster campus co-
hesion and prevent the breakdown of the institution. As President Richard Lyman put 
it after the AEL takeover,
If we are in diffi culties partly because our functions are many, and our focus can therefore 
never be single, it will do us no good to try to return to some simpler day. . . . Instead we 
ought to glory in the fact that some people are learning to appreciate Keats in one part of 
23 Student Radical Caucus, “Fire and Sandstone: The Last Radical Guide to Stanford,” n.d. [almost 
certainly 1969], William Rambo Papers SC 132, ACCN 97-093, SUA, box 6, folder 10, “Student 
Unrest, 1968-2.”
24 Glantz, “Comments about Engineers for Engineering by an Engineer,” Grindstone: A Forum for 
Controversial Issues of Special Interest to the Engineering Community—Sponsored by the Student- 
Faculty Liaison Committee of the School of Engineering, 30 Nov. 1970, 4– 16, SUA, Arch 3009 The 
Grindstone.
25 Quoted in Leslie, Cold War and American Science (cit. n. 1), 232.
26 Ibid., chap. 9.
27 Glantz, “Comments about Engineers” (cit. n. 24).
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the campus, while others are solving problems of linear programming in another. Glory 
in it, and make a towering virtue of necessity by exposing the one group to the other, and 
each to a thousand further groups, at every available opportunity.28
The interdisciplinarity thought necessary to preserve Stanford and to quiet unrest 
was far more wide- ranging and egalitarian than that promoted earlier by Terman. 
Terman’s interdisciplinarity had been a matter of regrounding engineering and so-
cial science disciplines in the ostensibly more fundamental knowledge of the natural 
sciences. Campus activists and faculty reformers of the Vietnam era, however, argued 
that the pressing social problems of the day were so complex as to require equal 
partnerships, not hierarchical relationships, ranging all across the social and natural 
sciences, engineering, and the humanities. As Stephen Kline, an engineer who co-
founded Stanford’s Values, Technology, and Society (VTS) program, put it, “The 
kinds of questions that do and should concern the students are: Do you build the 
SST [supersonic transport], and what is being done about smog? Questions of this 
sort cannot be seen clearly through the viewpoint of any single discipline.”29 Instead, 
Kline’s VTS program offered a new approach, with “various combinations of sci-
entists, engineers, philosophers, historians, anthropologists, psychologists, psychia-
trists, sociologists, ethicists, and theologians—all working very closely together.”30
Even skeptical faculty members and administrators in the Vietnam era commonly 
confl ated “interdisciplinary” with “applied” or “relevant” research and/or painted 
discipline- based research as the opposite of “problem- oriented” research. As Presi-
dent Lyman put it in 1971, “No matter how earnestly the effort is made by scholars to 
mount collaborative attacks on social problems, . . . results are bound to be slow and 
halting. . . . It will take more than some marriages among academic disciplines.”31 
Nevertheless, Lyman saw where things were headed: “If we succeed, as I trust we 
shall, in increasing the amount of multi- disciplinary, problem- oriented research that 
we do, this will happen in part because money is beginning to become available for 
such work from the Congress and from federal agencies.”32
Thus, even skeptics of reform could be persuaded to embrace a more radical form 
of interdisciplinarity in the late ’60s and early ’70s because the rapidly changing 
federal funding situation offered strong incentives to do so. In part, there was simply 
less money to go around: federal nondefense R&D budgets declined by close to 30 
percent from 1966 to 1976;33 total federal R&D funding reached a peak of 3 per-
cent of GDP in 1964 and declined steadily until the 1980s.34 At the same time, civil-
ian funders such as the NSF, the National Institutes of Health, and the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency began siphoning federal research funds away from national 
28 Quoted in “Defense Research Will Shift if Forced out of Universities,” Campus Report, 23 Sept. 
1970.
29 “Values, Technology, and Society Included in Experimental Program,” Campus Report, 19 May 
1971.
30 Ibid. Stanford later renamed the VTS program VTSS (Values, Technology, Science, and Society) 
and then STS (Science, Technology, and Society).
31 “Revolt against Reason Can Have ‘Ominous Consequences,’ ” Campus Report, 1 Jan. 1971.
32 “Lyman Looks at Future: Toward a More Open University,” Campus Report, 14 Apr. 1971.
33 Intersociety Working Group, American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS Re-
port XXXIII: Research and Development, FY 2009 (Washington, D.C., 2009), 24.
34 Homer A. Neal, Tobin L. Smith, and Jennifer B. McCormick, Beyond Sputnik: U.S. Science Policy 
in the 21st Century (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2008), 81.
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 security agencies, and shifted their emphasis toward applied research and engineer-
ing at the expense of basic science.
Given the unstable funding situation, Stanford researchers and administrators could 
see that the best strategy would be for individual faculty members to diversify their 
funding sources and reorient to Congress’s new priorities. More radical interdiscipli-
narity was one way to appeal to a wider set of funders, while simultaneously dampen-
ing campus unrest. Thus, Stanford saw a dramatic mushrooming of interdisciplinary 
degree- granting centers in this era: a doubling in the number of such centers between 
1968 and 1969, and a seven- times- higher rate of incorporation of such centers over 
the next twenty years than over the previous twenty. Most of these new centers were 
anchored in the humanities or social sciences, perhaps because, as Jamie Cohen- Cole 
has shown, an ideology of interdisciplinarity took hold of American social science 
in the ’50s.35 Indeed, when the university founded a Center for Interdisciplinary Re-
search in 1972, it used an existing interdisciplinary social science center, the Institute 
for Public Policy Analysis, to nucleate a broadening of “the scope of interdisciplin-
ary research activities to include engineering, the physical sciences, the professional 
schools and humanities, as well as economics and the social sciences.”36
In the School of Engineering, meanwhile, many of the faculty housed in the extra-
departmental research centers of the Terman era were, by the late ’60s, searching for 
civilian applied projects, diversifi ed funding sources, and (consequently) a broader 
type of interdisciplinarity. Stanford’s electrical engineers—an important constitu-
ency for CCRMA’s later explorations into computer music—were particularly 
prominent in turning toward interdisciplinary and applied, civilian projects such 
as biomedical technologies and aids for the handicapped. As John Linvill, chair of 
Electrical Engineering (EE), put it in a 1967 memo, “Stanford University can and 
should become more effective in studying and attacking the problems of today’s so-
ciety. Electrical Engineering, with its aim to bring technological tools to the solution 
of man’s problems, is interested to join with other departments in working on these 
contemporary problems . . . [such as] environmental studies, urban problems, prob-
lems of developing countries, etc. . . . [which] cannot be attacked within a single 
discipline.”37 Few Stanford engineers altogether abandoned defense- funded proj-
ects, whether out of budgetary necessity or because they saw such work as both good 
science and good citizenship. Yet whatever their politics, many Stanford engineers 
were clearly moving in the late ’60s toward work of the kind called for by antiwar 
reformers.
The situation in the late ’60s and early ’70s, then, was that the different parts of 
campus that would eventually contribute to CCRMA faced convergent pressures. 
For members of the still- unsettled music department, incentives for moving toward 
the Terman model by cooperating with engineers to bring in external basic- research 
35 Cohen- Cole, “Thinking about Thinking in Cold War America” (PhD diss., Princeton Univ., 2003).
36 Nancy Donham, Stanford University News Service release on the Center for Interdisciplinary 
Research, 10 July 1972, SUA, Stanford University Sponsored Projects Offi ce SC 344, box 14, folder 
“Center for Interdisciplinary Research (CIR), 1972– 1974.”
37 John G. Linvill, executive head, Department of EE, to the Committee for the Study of Stanford’s 
Educational Program, memorandum, “Re: Comments of Electrical Engineering on Stanford’s Educa-
tional Programs and Objectives,” 26 Jan. 1967, SUA, Calvin Quate Papers SC 347 (83-033)—1987 
accession, box 3, binder “Electrical Engineering.”
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funding and to grow links with industry would have been apparent. Stanford’s pre-
dominantly defense- funded engineers and computer scientists, meanwhile, could 
perceive incentives to modify the Terman model by cooperating with musicians and 
other humanists to demonstrate civilian applications. In such an environment, an 
emerging center that was interdisciplinary by nature, that addressed practical appli-
cations, that developed and leveraged technologies applicable in multiple settings, 
and that could garner external resources for these activities would suddenly fi nd itself 
the embodiment of new organizational perspectives and priorities.
CCRMA’S ROOTS: “FOOLING AROUND” AND CHANCE ENCOUNTERS
John Chowning, CCRMA’s cofounder and its most conspicuous initiator, arrived at 
Stanford in 1962 in order to pursue a doctoral degree in music composition. He had 
earlier studied composition in Paris, where he was exposed to—and intrigued by—
electronic music. Upon his arrival at Stanford, with its newly created music depart-
ment, however, he was dismayed to fi nd that there were neither facilities for elec-
tronic music nor an interest in creating them.
Nevertheless, Chowning’s interest in the fi eld was known to others, including his 
fellow members of the Stanford Symphony Orchestra. In January 1964, one of these 
members passed him a copy of an article from Science that described how a computer 
could be used as a musical instrument. (The orchestra member’s husband subscribed 
to Science because he was on the faculty at Stanford Medical School.) The article’s 
author was Max Mathews, a researcher at Bell Telephone Laboratories. There, com-
puter music developed from an attempt to create tones that would resemble speech 
but be more amenable to analysis. As Mathews and his colleague, John Pierce, put it,
There is a very close analogy between the voice and a bowed- stringed instrument. . . . 
Concepts and analytical techniques developed in speech research should be useful in 
studying the sounds of bowed- stringed instruments, and in fact much of the computer- 
programming and all of the peripheral equipment used in this study were originally de-
signed for speech research.38
Mathews’s repositioning of the computer as a musical instrument thus refl ects the 
discussion by John Tresch and Emily Dolan (in this volume) of “telos,” or the ends to 
which instruments are used. Mathews’s insight was to use music to simplify his data 
while at the same time importing a tool used for other purposes—the computer—
into the world of music.
Critically for CCRMA, Mathews and Pierce were open to collaboration and con-
versation with musicians. In fact, Mathews, Pierce, and other Bell engineers collabo-
rated with several artists in 1966 to produce a series of performance- art presenta-
tions, 9 Evenings: Theatre and Engineering.39 Mathews and Pierce were also closely 
38 Mathews, Joan E. Miller, Pierce, and James Tenney, “Computer Study of Violin Tones—Case 
25952,” Bell Labs technical memorandum, 15 Nov. 1965, John Pierce Papers, Huntington Library, 
San Marino, Calif. (hereafter cited as Pierce Papers), box 7, binder “Technical Memoranda 1956– 
1968.”
39 P. Miller, “The Engineer as Catalyst: Billy Kluver on Working with Artists,” IEEE Spectrum 35 
(July 1998): 20– 9. More generally, Mathews, Pierce, and Chowning were leading exemplars of the 
heightened mutual regard and interaction among engineers and artists in the 1960s, particularly in 
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connected to Stanford through faculty members in applied physics and EE who had 
formerly worked at Bell Labs. Thus, Chowning was able to visit Mathews the sum-
mer after taking a computer programming course in the spring of 1964. Mathews pro-
vided Chowning with direction and, crucially, the Music IV computer program that 
Mathews had created to generate computer sound on Bell’s IBM 7090.40
Computers were somewhat rare commodities at the time, however, and Chown-
ing’s search for one on which to implement Music IV led him to the rapidly expand-
ing Stanford Artifi cial Intelligence Project. As he recalled:
In autumn of ’64 . . . I met Dave Poole. I had this box of [punch] cards from Max 
[Mathews]. We knew one another from the Stanford orchestra. He was a tuba player 
and I was a percussionist, so we were right next to one another. . . . Poole was an applied 
math major, maybe in his second or third year. He was a hacker. He was sort of on the 
periphery of the AI lab.41
With support from Poole, whose programming skills had become indispensable to 
the AI project, and from Les Earnest, the AI project’s deputy director and the hus-
band of a local music teacher, Chowning implemented Mathews’s program on the AI 
project’s PDP- 1 computer later that year. Over the next several years, Chowning con-
tinued his work on computer- synthesized and manipulated sound, receiving his doc-
toral degree in 1966 and joining the music department faculty that same year. He had 
a major breakthrough in 1967, when some late- night “fooling around” (as Chowning 
himself describes it42) resulted in the discovery of frequency modulation synthesis, a 
technique that permits the creation of complex sounds with relatively few computa-
tions. Yamaha Corporation of Japan ultimately licensed the technique in 1975, and, 
after several more years of development by Yamaha and Stanford, it formed the basis 
of a suite of electronic musical instruments that was extremely profi table for both 
organizations. Once CCRMA was founded, its personnel built an active industrial 
affi liates program and an intellectual property portfolio of several dozen patents. To-
day, they contribute to a wide range of companies, many of which they started. The 
center itself is now one of the world’s premier places for computer music and digital 
audio research.43
CCRMA’s success had many sources. In part, it benefi ted from ties to fi rms such as 
AT&T and Yamaha and to the emergence of a global computer and electronic music 
community. CCRMA was also fostered in part by features of Stanford’s music de-
New York (near which Bell Labs was located) and the Bay Area (including Stanford). See Matthew 
Wisnioski, Engineers for Change: Competing Visions of Technology in 1960s America (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2012); Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future (Chicago, 2011); 
Christina Dunbar- Hester, “Listening to Cybernetics: Music, Machines, and Nervous Systems, 1950– 
1980,” Sci. Tech. Hum. Val. 35 (2010): 113– 39.
40 M. V. Mathews, “The Digital Computer as a Musical Instrument,” Science 142 (1 Nov. 1963), 
553– 7. Chowning recalled the sequence of events in a 25 Mar. 2008 interview with Andrew Nelson 
in Palo Alto, Calif. Pieces of the story are captured in other accounts, too, including an interview of 
Chowning conducted by Vincent Plush on 31 May 1983 in Palo Alto as part of the Yale Oral History 
Project.
41 Chowning, interview by Nelson (cit. n. 40).
42 Chowning, interview by Plush (cit. n. 40).
43 For other accounts of CCRMA’s growth and the Yamaha relationship, see Nelson, “Cacophony 
or Harmony” (cit. n. 20); Tim Reiffenstein, “Codifi cation, Patents and the Geography of Knowledge 
Transfer in the Electronic Musical Instrument Industry,” Canadian Geographer 50 (2006): 298– 318; 
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partment. For example, the department’s relative youth meant it had not developed 
a coherent internal identity around any one particular program. Rather, the music 
department at the time was experimenting with programs such as jazz studies, per-
formance practice, and early dance, all of which were products of individual faculty 
members’ initiative. Support from music department faculty members proved critical 
to Chowning’s graduate studies, too. Under the chair system that was in place, gradu-
ate students could pursue any topic that their adviser supported, regardless of depart-
mental interests or pressures. As Chowning recalled in 1982, “Not many universities 
would have allowed me the freedom to do what I’ve done.”44 The music department’s 
policies thus enabled Chowning’s unusual exploration of computer music.
CCRMA also benefi ted from a variety of fortuitous encounters and events, both 
inside and outside Stanford. These included Chowning’s fellow orchestra member 
passing him Mathews’s Science article, Mathews’s willingness to share his computer 
program, Poole and Chowning’s collocation in the Stanford symphony and Poole’s 
subsequent assistance in implementing the computer code, and Chowning’s late- 
night fooling around. Absent any of these, CCRMA’s history might have unfolded 
quite differently. Yet these coincidences, as well as the felicitous characteristics and 
policies of the music department, had such an impact on CCRMA’s development be-
cause of the larger institutional environment. That environment, as we have argued, 
was shaped by Vietnam- era tensions and budgetary conditions that incentivized prac-
tical applications and wide- ranging interdisciplinary collaboration.
INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND CCRMA’S TIE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
On one level, the very term “computer music” implies an interdisciplinary con-
nection. Nevertheless, it is instructive to unpack the ways in which the activities at 
CCRMA refl ected the more radical interdisciplinarity that emerged in the 1960s. 
This disciplinary diversity was evident, in part, in individuals such as Chowning him-
self. In writing of Chowning’s promotion to full professor, for instance, the spring 
1979 music department newsletter noted,
Chowning’s achievements in composition, teaching and research touch upon several dis-
ciplines. His research has been primarily in acoustics and psychoacoustics (the psychol-
ogy of sound perception). He has developed computer techniques for creating the illusion 
of sound localization and movement through space, for artifi cial reverberation, and for 
synthesizing and generating any sound that can be produced by loudspeakers.45
Chowning and his associates were quick, however, to point out that no individual 
alone could master the wide variety of disciplines that contribute to computer music.
For instance, F. Richard Moore, a former CCRMA student who went on to build 
the computer music program at the University of California, San Diego, described 
the epistemic challenge of computer music this way in 1979:
The complexity of the new technological tools . . . require[s] cooperative team efforts 
for their use. Musicians have traditionally worked in highly individualistic ways . . . 
44 Stanford Department of Music, “Computer Music Comes of Age,” Music at Stanford, Oct. 1982. 
Included with the Stanford Observer, Oct. 1982, sec. 2.
45 Stanford Department of Music, “Chowning Appointed to Full Professorship,” Music at Stanford, 
Spring 1979, 1.
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[but] using computers to study music requires simultaneous attendance to . . . computer 
science, engineering, acoustics, psychoacoustics, and music. . . . It is unlikely (or at least 
rare) that individuals will possess all of the requisite skills and knowledge needed for ef-
fective use of computers in music making or study.46
Moore’s refl ections are not entirely new, of course: science and music share deep 
historical connections, as documented throughout this volume. The interdisciplin-
arity imagined and implemented by Chowning and Moore, however, involved mul-
tiple participants contributing unique—and equally valued—expertise, rather than 
individual scientist- musicians or scientists such as Helmholtz or Mach (on whom 
see, respectively, Kursell and Hui in this volume), who combined different forms of 
expertise in a single person.
Thus, CCRMA addressed the challenge of interdisciplinarity by bringing together 
individuals who were highly skilled in their particular disciplines but also reliant 
upon other individuals to fully realize their objectives. Rather than smothering in-
dividual creativity (which Moore cautioned that musicians would resist), CCRMA 
leveraged interdisciplinary teamwork to enable the full expression of individualis-
tic goals. Contemporary descriptions of the center, in publications ranging from the 
Stanford campus newspaper to Newsweek to Rolling Stone, emphasized these inter-
disciplinary underpinnings. In fact, of the dozens of articles published on CCRMA in 
the 1970s, every one mentions the word “interdisciplinary,” with most pieces dwell-
ing at length on the range of disciplines found at the center.
The form of that interdisciplinarity was precisely fi tted to the convergent incen-
tives faced by different parts of the Stanford campus. As Chowning and two col-
leagues wrote in a 1974 grant proposal made jointly to the NSF and the National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA),
A major contribution to present and future music exists in the application of a rapidly de-
veloping computer technology to the art and science of music. The extraordinary results 
already obtained have occurred in those few instances where scientists and musicians 
have taken the opportunity to bring their respective skills to bear on problems of com-
mon interest in a rich interdisciplinary environment. It is an example of cooperation, but 
more, an expression of the freedom of intellect and invention, where creative minds from 
diverse disciplines have joined in a common goal to produce fundamental knowledge 
which must be the source for new music, and to produce works of art which refl ect the 
scientifi c- technological riches of the present.47
That is, NSF funding for CCRMA would enable the center to expose musicians to 
the methods and values of scientists and engineers, allowing researchers to “produce 
fundamental knowledge” for the “science of music”—exactly the model established 
by Terman. At the same time, CCRMA would assist scientists and engineers in the 
“application of a rapidly developing computer technology to the art” of music “in a 
rich interdisciplinary environment”—exactly the kind of humanistic collaboration 
46 Moore, “The Nature of Music Research,” Directions: Center for Music Experiment and Related 
Research (newsletter, University of California, San Diego), Dec. 1979, 1– 2.
47 John M. Chowning, Leland C. Smith, and Albert Cohen, “The Computer Music Facility: A New 
Musical Medium,” proposal submitted to the NEA in conjunction with the proposal “Computer Simu-
lation of Music Instrument Tones in Reverberant Spaces” submitted to the NSF, 18 June 1974, SUA, 
CCRMA ACCN 2001-262, box 7.
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and civilian application that would bring diversifi ed funding and approval from cam-
pus activists.
The structure and location of CCRMA within the broader university environment 
played a critical role in facilitating this disciplinary mixing. Current CCRMA direc-
tor Chris Chafe, who arrived as a graduate student in the late 1970s, has argued that, 
on the one hand, CCRMA’s administrative home in the music department is critical 
for attracting music personnel to the collaboration: “This is a cross- disciplinary, very 
artistic, technical, everybody- helping- each- other kind of environment. . . . Imagine 
the facility being located in a more technical department, what the barrier would be 
for musicians approaching. Would they feel they’re free to come join the project if 
it were headed towards engineering?”48 On the other hand, as Chowning recalled 
in 1982, CCRMA’s early leaders “felt the separation [from the music department] 
was necessary because our work was different from the usual Music Department 
activity.”49
In fact, CCRMA has always been physically separated from the rest of the music 
department, following the model of earlier semi- independent research centers: for 
example, the Center for Materials Research was aligned with, but not part of (or lim-
ited in its personnel to) the materials science and engineering department; the In-
tegrated Circuits Lab was aligned with, but not part of or limited to the EE depart-
ment. Chowning and other CCRMA leaders recognized that the trick was to be both 
separate from and connected to a variety of groups simultaneously. As Chowning re-
marked in 1975, “Every center tends to build a wall around itself. . . . We hope to pro-
vide intellectual ventilation as well as coordination.”50 CCRMA, therefore, thrived at 
an almost contradictory intersection between autonomy and authority, connectedness 
and isolation, individualism and teamwork. In a university environment struggling 
to fi nd the appropriate organization for interdisciplinary activities, such ambiguity 
advantaged a group that could not quite be categorized and might, therefore, be all 
things to all people (or, at least, many things to many people).
At the center of CCRMA’s multivalent milieu were the computer and associated 
sound- generating and processing algorithms. We label these tools “multivocal tech-
nologies” in reference to their ability to span both disciplinary boundaries and areas 
of applied interest. A multivocal technology exhibits generality and fl exibility, and is 
subject to different interpretations depending on the group that employs or interacts 
with it. Our conceptualization of multivocal technologies differs from “boundary ob-
jects,” though it certainly shares features in common with this concept. Fundamen-
tally, boundary objects facilitate communication between diverse groups, enabling 
them to arrive at a shared understanding and to work together.51 As is highlighted by 
the interdisciplinary context of CCRMA, a multivocal technology such as the com-
puter can, like a boundary object, permit groups to work together; however, it does so 
in a way that is more refl ective of Peter Galison’s “trading zones”—where different 
48 Chafe, interview by Andrew Nelson, 7 Mar. 2002, Stanford, Calif.
49 J. Bailie, “Computer Music: A Trend That’s Caught Fire,” Stanford Daily, 20 July 1982, 7.
50 Paul Hertelendy, “Stanford’s Musical ‘Marriage,’ ” Oakland Tribune, 12 Jan. 1975, 20.
51 Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, “Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary 
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907– 39,” Social 
Studies of Science 19 (1989): 387– 420; Paul R. Carlile, “A Pragmatic View of Knowledge and Bound-
aries: Boundary Objects in New Product Development,” Organization Science 13 (2002): 442– 55; 
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tion,” American Journal of Sociology 109 (2003): 720– 52.
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parties do not need to agree about the context of collaboration—than it is of bound-
ary objects.52
More pointedly, our inspiration for multivocal technologies draws, in part, on John 
Padgett and Christopher Ansell’s work on the Medici family in Renaissance Italy, 
which derived power from its ability to maintain separation between networks of 
political, economic, and social infl uence; the relationship illustrated by Padgett and 
Ansell is not so much focused on bringing together through commonality as it is on 
lying between by presenting different faces to different groups.53 Thus, multivocal 
technologies not only embody a high level of interpretive fl exibility, but also enable 
participants to exploit this interpretive fl exibility to serve different ends depending on 
the pattern of relationships in play.54
That is, multivocality is intentional, even Machiavellian. Actors must choose to 
position themselves where they can sing different tunes to different audiences so that 
they can obtain resources from each audience. Other historians of technology have 
observed that computers and musical instruments have been useful “liminal entities” 
with which actors can mediate between different groups.55 Particularly in the late 
1960s, electronic musical instruments allowed such individuals to perform a “legiti-
macy exchange,” whereby technologists accrued social capital from artists and vice 
versa.56 Our study goes somewhat further, however, in showing how the multivocality 
of a technology (the computer) was amplifi ed by innovation in the form of an organ-
ization (CCRMA).
The computer is not an inevitably multivocal technology, but it has been made 
multi vocal in many different institutional contexts, including CCRMA. As Dick Moore 
wrote in 1979, “The computer may be viewed as a general purpose tool with the un-
precedented function of extending our power of mind, as other tools extend our mus-
cular or sensorial powers.”57 Chowning and others repeatedly emphasized the broad 
appeal of the computer as a research tool in gathering resources and accruing prestige 
for CCRMA. For example, the 1974 application to the NEA referenced above cited 
the research applications of the computer at Bell Labs, claiming, “Based on this past 
experience, the proposed [CCRMA] facility will maintain those attributes of general-
ity, fl exibility, and precision which have been of utmost importance in the research 
performed to date.”58
As we have seen, Bell Labs researchers such as Mathews and Pierce employed the 
computer (almost literally) as a multivocal technology, not simply for generating and 
analyzing musical sounds, but also for building a diverse network of interlocutors 
interested in computer music: for example, Yale composer James Tenney, President 
Nixon’s science adviser Edward David, and science fi ction author Arthur C. Clarke. 
Pierce and Mathews in turn openly admired Chowning and CCRMA’s similar use of 
52 Galison, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago, 1997).
53 Padgett and Ansell, “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400– 1434,” Amer. J. Sociol. 98 
(1993): 1259– 319.
54 Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technologi-
cal Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Mass., 1987).
55 Trevor Pinch and Frank Trocco, Analog Days: The Invention and Impact of the Moog Synthesizer 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2004).
56 Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and 
the Rise of Digital Utopianism (Chicago, 2006).
57 Moore, “Nature of Music Research” (cit. n. 46), 2.
58 Ibid., 3.
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the computer as both a musical technology and the centerpiece of a heterogeneous 
network. As Pierce put it in letters of recommendation for Chowning,
Most musicians shy away from the computer and need a great deal of help to use it ef-
fectively. Chowning not only knew how to make the computer work; he knew what to 
do with it. . . . In a day when many artists mouth science vainly, it is rare but extremely 
pleasing to fi nd one, John Chowning, who understands and uses science.59
Or, more succinctly, “Chowning has contrived to show great originality and leader-
ship. Starting from essentially nothing, he has brought diverse talents together into a 
fi eld of common general interest.”60
Endorsements from Bell Labs carried special weight at Stanford given Mathews’s 
and Pierce’s strong ties there. Mathews took a sabbatical in the Stanford Artifi cial 
Intelligence Project in 1969, and both he and Pierce eventually took faculty posi-
tions affi liated with CCRMA. Both men were also in regular contact with former 
Bell Labs team members at Stanford, including John Linvill (chair of EE) and Calvin 
Quate (in EE and applied physics, but also—on temporary assignment—an associ-
ate dean with oversight of Chowning’s tenure case). Indeed, Quate sought Pierce’s 
help in 1970 in securing philanthropic funding for his own answer to the relevance 
agenda, an acoustic microscope for biological research—in response to which Pierce 
teasingly asked whether the microscope was “fi re resistant and bomb proof? Or, are 
things now quiet at Stanford?”61
Thus, CCRMA researchers’ emphasis on generality allowed them to connect to 
broader networks that employed the same central tool and to draw legitimacy from 
their connection to those networks. Indeed, CCRMA researchers pushed the general-
ity of their approach to extremes in search of funding and interlocutors. For example, 
a 1977 NSF grant application argued, “The work to be performed under this project 
is directed toward answering basic questions about the variety of forms in which in-
formation can fl ow between man and computer, and the factors which limit the rate 
of this information fl ow.”62 Here, music was the concrete context, but the use of a 
multivocal technology in that context enabled musicians to contribute to a highly ab-
stract debate about the nature of information of the kind traditionally associated with 
physics, math, and EE.
The multivocality of the computer was indispensable in helping CCRMA’s lead-
ers satisfy the sometimes confl icting demands on faculty members at research uni-
versities in the 1970s. On the one hand, the computer aided CCRMA personnel in 
doing the kind of basic research that would establish their scientifi c credibility. As 
one reviewer of a 1977 NSF grant wrote, “In past proposals the National Science 
Foundation has had to consider whether it was supporting music as an art or whether 
it was supporting a scientifi c study. In this proposal, there is no question about the 
59 Pierce to Albert Cohen, Department of Music, Stanford, 21 Mar. 1978, Pierce Papers, box 5, 
folder “Misc. Correspondence H– Z, 1973– 79.”
60 Pierce to Wolfgang Kuhn, Department of Music, Stanford, n.d., Pierce Papers, box 5, folder 
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61 Pierce to Quate, 19 Oct. 1970, Pierce Papers, box 5, binder “Correspondence, External, August 
1969– March 1971.”
62 John Chowning and Loren Rush, “An Interactive Graphical Environment for Musical, Acousti-
cal, and Psychoacoustical Research,” project summary for NSF grant no. MCS77-23743, 1977, SUA, 
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focus of the effort. The work is entirely of a scientifi c nature; only the applications 
concern music.”63 Chowning himself reinforced this rhetoric. For example, in a 1982 
student- newspaper story reporting that “since 1975, CCRMA has received over 
$1 million from the NSF to support its work,” Chowning explained, “These grants 
have been based on the scientifi c aspects of our work in psycho- acoustics and signal 
processing.”64 That is, for some audiences, music provided the context of CCRMA’s 
work, but the focus was on scientifi c advance.
On the other hand, some CCRMA personnel and external commentators recog-
nized that music was not only a convenient context, but also a top benefi ciary of 
research support. For example, another reviewer of the 1977 NSF grant emphasized 
that the musical implications of CCRMA’s proposed research were exciting precisely 
because of their impact on a fi eld of “practical” and “applied” importance (music):
The timbre perception proposal is superb! It is a pattern for the kind of research that 
should be emphasized today. It is one of the too rare cases where scientifi c studies are 
making real contributions to an area of great applied importance. There are plenty of areas 
where good scientifi c methods are discovering interesting new things about the world, 
but often the new information does not have clear importance in applications. Likewise, 
there are plenty of important practical problems, but too often scientifi c methods can 
make only weak contributions to their solutions. The fundamental studies proposed here 
can produce information of enormous importance to music, both for immediate applica-
tions and for the far future.65
Six years later, a reviewer of another NSF grant also identifi ed the arts not as a con-
venient context for fundamental research, but as a full participant in, and benefi ciary 
of, CCRMA’s brand of interdisciplinary, applied research:
I cannot recommend this proposal more highly. . . . How many projects combine and 
bear fruit in fi elds as diverse as signal processing, artifi cial intelligence, and acoustics, 
while having profound implications in the arts? The benefi ts of such research to the 
music recording industry are clear.66
Thus, in the hands of CCRMA personnel, the computer allowed for continual feed-
back and alternation in the relationship between musical instrument and research. 
Not only was the musical instrument useful as a research tool—as in the accounts 
provided by Pesic and Kursell in this volume, as well as others—but insights about 
the research tool were made useful in a musical context as well.
Indeed, the blurring of distinctions among scientifi c research, technological de-
velopment, and musical composition is reinforced by a peculiar feature of computer 
music. In traditional composition, the instruments are (relatively) fi xed and the com-
position process focuses upon orchestration and the specifi c notes to be played by 
each instrument. In computer music, however, the instruments themselves need to 
be “composed” via computer code. The sonic possibilities are, therefore, unknown 
63 Reviewer comments on NSF proposal no. BNS- 7722305, “Experiments in Timbre Perception,” 
submitted by John Chowning and John Grey, 1 Sept. 1977, SUA, CCRMA ACCN 2001-262, box 7.
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65 Reviewer comments on “Experiments in Timbre Perception” (cit. n. 63).
66 Reviewer evaluation form for NSF proposal no. MCS- 8214350, “An Intelligent System for the 
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prior to—and become known through—composition. At CCRMA (as described by 
composer Michael McNabb, who earned his PhD there in the 1970s), the process of 
composing “instruments” and composing “music” was often iterative and involved 
the distributed cognition of an interdisciplinary team:
It’s really hard to even separate where all the creativity came from. When you talk about 
one piece of music, any one piece of music, there couldn’t help but be at least half a dozen 
people involved besides the composer because we had to write our own software, the en-
gineers had to build their own equipment, all this stuff. It was like you’d lose track: Did 
Julius [Smith, an electrical engineer] come up with this special [engineering] thing and 
we thought, “Well, that’s cool. I’m going to use it in a piece.” Or the other way around: 
“I want to do X” and they [people like Julius Smith] would say, “Well one way you could 
do that is like this.”67
Compositional and research activities, and musical and technical activities, were in-
separable. For this reason, many observers felt that CCRMA represented a new mar-
riage between art and science. Each fi eld benefi ted independently; science and engi-
neering benefi ted art and, crucially, art provided a path forward for new scientifi c and 
technological developments.
By helping to blur these different domains, the computer facilitated CCRMA’s 
reach beyond the ivory tower of research to engage the world of musical performance 
and appreciation directly. For example, in 1975, the Stanford Daily interviewed 
CCRMA personnel who downplayed “academic” activities and instead emphasized 
the practical applications of computer music:
Fears that computer music will be “highly academic” are “clearly silly,” Moorer stated. . . . 
“Computer music may be a ‘laboratory thing’ now but in fi ve to 10 years,” Moorer pre-
dicted, it will be a suitcase- size “performing stage popular instrument.” The computer as 
a musical instrument could eventually “fi nd its way into everyone’s home,” Grey added.68
Chowning, too, asserted (in 1979), “This is not an acoustical lab. We defi ne our prob-
lems as ‘real- world’ problems; we don’t use anechoic chambers [sound- absorbing 
rooms common in acoustics research environments] because nobody listens in one.”69
This connection to “real- world” problems of performance allowed CCRMA to 
appeal for funding not just from civilian research- funding agencies such as the NSF, 
but also from arts organizations such as the NEA and the California Arts Council, 
and from commercial fi rms and industry groups. CCRMA’s research tools were also 
multivocal enough to appeal to defense funding agencies, especially as time went 
on and defense R&D budgets bounced back (while the stigma associated with such 
funding waned). Indeed, by 1985, Stanford’s Sponsored Projects Offi ce was advising 
CCRMA to mine the intersection of civilian and national security funding: “NSF is 
mixed in with Navy and DARPA. . . . Helpful buzzwords on their interests include: 
67 McNabb, interview by Andrew Nelson, 17 Apr. 2009, San Francisco.
68 Ann Amioka, “Computers Add New Dimension to Music,” Stanford Daily, 5 Mar. 1975. Andy 
Moorer was an EE PhD student who would go on to develop the sound studio for LucasFilm and to 
found the fi rm Sonic Solutions. John Grey was a psychology doctoral candidate. It’s worth noting that 
Grey’s prediction was prescient: through LucasFilm, Moorer did bring computer music into every 
home, and the CCRMA- enabled Yamaha FM synthesis chip powered the fi rst wave of sound cards in 
multimedia home computers.
69 Michael Walsh, “Applying New Technology to an Ancient Art,” Palo Alto Times, 12 Nov. 1979.
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Conditioning sound waves, acoustics, signal processing—intelligibility problems, 
and signal processing—underwater acoustics.”70 The next year, CCRMA followed 
up by submitting a grant request to the Offi ce of Naval Research. Similarly, in 1986 
Pierce directed CCRMA’s attention to a man from the National Security Agency 
“who expressed considerable interest in supporting work on a vocal- tract model for 
high- quality speech and song. The chances of success are 40– 60%, even in these bad 
times.”71
In an institutional environment that struggled with tensions and contradictions 
between basic and applied research, military and civilian applications, and disciplin-
ary rigor versus interdisciplinary problem solving, CCRMA managed—via innova-
tions in both organization and its multivocal research tools—to position itself as em-
bodying all of these things simultaneously. That fl exibility allowed CCRMA to secure 
resources from stakeholders with very different objectives and to nimbly reposition it-
self as the funding environment changed. The multivocality of CCRMA’s tools, prac-
tices, and personnel also allowed it to connect into very different networks both inside 
and outside Stanford and thereby to accrue legitimacy and ameliorate confl ict.
EARNING MERIT FOR CCRMA
That is, the formation of a constituency for computer music at Stanford, and its for-
malization under the umbrella of CCRMA, were facilitated by the fact that computer 
music offered something for everyone during a time of crisis. For idealists, it offered 
a more humanistic, holistic vision of science and engineering; for doves, the possi-
bility of making military- industrial technologies relevant to civilian applications; 
for embattled administrators, a way to use an expansive form of interdisciplinarity 
to lubricate campus friction; and for cash- strapped, protest- besieged scientists and 
engineers, a way to solicit money from both military funders and civilian agencies, 
private philanthropies, and commercial fi rms. That diversity of funding in turn al-
lowed CCRMA’s members and (especially) Stanford’s administrators to demonstrate 
to protesters that some of their demands were being met.
For CCRMA and electronic music to help those stakeholders achieve their aims, 
however, news of CCRMA’s work had to be distributed widely. That is, if the bud-
getary and legitimacy crises of the late ’60s and early ’70s helped open the door for 
music to enter the laboratory at Stanford, those crises also required that computer 
music come back out of the laboratory and be heard by anyone who would listen. 
Trustees needed to be shown that Stanford faculty members were looking for funding 
wherever they could fi nd it; campus activists needed to be shown that Stanford engi-
neers were in the process of turning toward more civilian, socially relevant projects; 
administrators needed to be shown that CCRMA really could bring different sides of 
the campus together.
This theme played out wherever Stanford engineers sought expansive interdisci-
plinarity, civilian applications, and diversifi ed funding in the late ’60s and early ’70s. 
For instance, the AEL takeover of 1969 prompted Stanford’s School of Engineering 
70 Sponsored Projects Offi ce to Patte Wood, CCRMA, handwritten memorandum, 1985, SUA, 
ACCN 2001-262, box 13.
71 John R. Pierce to John Chowning, Patte Wood, and Julius Smith, memorandum, 15 Dec. 1986, 
SUA, ACCN- 2001-262, box 4.
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to prominently tout its faculty members’ work on civilian- relevant applications such 
as biomedical sensors and aids for the handicapped—work that had previously been 
buried at the back of annual reports.72 Similarly, the commingling of music and engi-
neering played an outsize role in Stanford’s promotion of itself (often, to itself) as an 
institution capable of overcoming Vietnam- era adversity.
For instance, President Lyman, in bemoaning the divisions tearing the university 
apart, made explicit gestures to music and computing as fi elds whose practitioners 
had far more in common than they might know or admit:
It is an arrogant assumption of some humanists that no computer man reads Keats, and 
no electronics buff can dig Scarlatti. It is an arrogant counter- assumption of some tech-
nologists that no humanist has anything important to contribute to life in the technitronic 
age of the future. The university exists in part to attack such arrogant parochialisms.73
Similarly, researchers whose livelihoods were threatened by the protests against on- 
campus classifi ed work eagerly embraced music as one of the civilian application 
areas benefi ting from nominally secret research. As David Gray, a researcher in the 
AEL, wrote to Kenneth Arrow in 1966,
That classifi ed research will benefi t the human race is apparent when one surveys the 
ever more numerous outgrowths of such research. To enumerate, there are SLAC [the 
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center], air traffi c control, jet transportation, and isotopes 
for cancer research. . . . Musical instruments will be synthesized by a computer eventu-
ally placing an entire symphonic orchestra in the hands of a composer who will need only 
to communicate his composition to the synthesizer. He will then be able to listen and 
improve. At Stanford, research in encoding, in propagation of optical data processing, in 
integrated circuits, and in acoustic couplers are all relevant to such future development.74
When members of the divided university sought common ground, therefore, elec-
tronic music was one of a handful of guiding examples of how to do so.
For instance, when an ad hoc committee of faculty members was formed in 1971 
to address “increased campus interest in research,” it put together a research “expo-
sition extending over the entire campus community. Interdisciplinary activities par-
ticularly are desired,”75 such as
the use of holography (three- dimensional laser holography) in displaying art objects, a 
continuous interactive opinion poll with a computer terminal, the use of electronic de-
vices to help the blind and to measure medical data inside the body, and a presentation of 
computer- composed music.76
As a site of multivocal activity, the research that later became CCRMA’s focus was 
an obvious fi t for a public exhibition of Stanford faculty members’ abilities to work 
72 Stanford Electronics Laboratories, Stanford University Electronics Research Review 11 (12 Aug. 
1969), SUA, Collection 3120/ 4 STAN.
73 Quoted in “Defense Research Will Shift” (cit. n. 28).
74 Gray to Kenneth Arrow, memorandum, 2 July 1966, SUA, SC 132, ACCN 97-093, William Rambo 
Papers, folder 7, “Stud. Unrest, 1966-1.”
75 “Research Exposition Is Planned; Organizational Meeting Tomorrow,” Campus Report, 9 Dec. 
1970.
76 “Research Exposition Is Planned,” Campus Report, 27 Jan. 1971.
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across disciplinary lines and to broaden the university’s research portfolio beyond 
national security concerns.
Stanford administrators were particularly eager to have campus research reach out 
to the local communities of the San Francisco Peninsula, driven by pressure both 
from those local communities and from campus activists and reform- minded faculty 
who insisted that “as Stanford has grown in national prestige in the last twenty years, 
it has become simultaneously more and more isolated politically, educationally, and 
fi nancially from its immediate community, neither serving it nor supported by it.”77 
Few areas of research lent themselves better to overcoming such isolation than a per-
formance art such as computer music. Indeed, CCRMA’s leaders viewed CCRMA, 
and before it SAIL, as natural venues for connecting Stanford to its environs. A 1974 
NSF funding application described the center’s outreach efforts:
Publications and Performances
A normal function of the Center, indeed an obligation, will be the publication of results 
on a lay level as well as technical. Publications and tapes for performance could then 
be made available to large numbers of communities throughout the nation through the 
Executive Directors of the State Arts Councils.
Site Visits and Symposia
It is a normal circumstance to have a large number of visitors at the Stanford Artifi cial 
Intelligence Laboratory. Over the past years we have given demonstrations to groups 
ranging from school children to professionals in the fi eld. With a relatively independent 
satellite system as proposed, we could signifi cantly expand visits without causing incon-
venience to the main laboratory. . . .
As a part of the nation’s Bicentennial, we propose that the Center at Stanford, an ex-
ample of computer based interdisciplinary research and composition, organize a series of 
concerts of computer music, lecture- demonstrations, laboratory visits, and a symposium 
in the Spring and Summer of 1976. In this way, the public can share the excitement of ap-
plying its advanced technology to the discovery of new knowledge regarding sound and 
perception and to new means for the composition and performance of music.78
These efforts met with good success, too: by the early 1980s, CCRMA concerts had 
already attracted over a thousand attendees.79
OTHER FORMS OF TRANSLATION
Performances for local communities were by no means the only form of outreach en-
visioned for CCRMA. Chowning and other leaders organized their center to translate 
research out to society at large. Some of those conduits of translation were adapted 
from early Cold War centers such as the Microwave Lab; others emerged partly in 
response to the conditions of the early ’70s.
One obvious CCRMA output was personnel. Students such as Dick Moore and 
Andy Moorer from CCRMA’s early cohorts received offers from organizations, such 
77 Flyer for “open meeting sponsored by FPAG (Faculty Political Action Group),” [ca. 18 Feb. 
1971], SUA, Stanford University Sponsored Projects Offi ce SC 344, ACCN 1987-130, box 1, folder 
1, “Committee on Research 1970– 71.”
78 Chowning, Smith, and Cohen, “Computer Music Facility” (cit. n. 47), 5– 6.
79 Xavier Serra and Patte Wood, eds., “Overview: Center for Computer Research in Music and 
Acoustics” (Stanford Department of Music Report Stan- M- 44, March 1988); Julia Sommer, “Com-
puter Music Audiences Mushroom,” Stanford News Offi ce press release, 28 June 1982.
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as the Eastman School and the University of California, San Diego, that were looking 
to set up similar efforts in computer music. Musicians such as Györgi Ligeti stayed 
at CCRMA as composers in residence, then left to spread the word about computer 
music in general and Stanford’s program in particular. Thus, through the produc-
tion of personnel, CCRMA was able to export its organizational model. Indeed, that 
seems to have been one of Chowning’s ambitions from the beginning. As the 1974 
NSF proposal put it, CCRMA and its multivocal tools would serve “as a prototype 
for other and future systems.”80 Within the fi rst few years of CCRMA’s existence, the 
center had infl uenced programs in locations as far- fl ung as Paris and Hamburg.81
The production of personnel to export institutional models was, in some ways, an 
aim borrowed from semi- independent labs of the early Cold War such as Stanford’s 
Center for Materials Research.82 By the late ’60s, however, leaders of Stanford’s 
semi- independent research centers saw a need to produce something more than per-
sonnel. One path Stanford researchers increasingly took was to patent their research 
and seek fi rms to license those patents; some even founded start-ups to commercial-
ize their research themselves. Music technologies played an outsize, if underappreci-
ated, role in the exploratory commercialization of Stanford research in the ’70s. For 
instance, one of Stanford’s most active patenters in this era was Calvin Quate in ap-
plied physics and EE; among Quate’s many patent disclosures was one from 1974 for 
an “electronic device for converting written music to audible sound.”83 CCRMA per-
sonnel, too, eagerly looked for commercial spin- offs from their research. Chowning, 
as noted, was an early and frequent patenter, and some of his intellectual property 
eventually became the most lucrative portion of Stanford’s portfolio.
Commercial translations were not confi ned to patents and licenses, however. 
CCRMA also used its multivocal technology as a basis for cooperative research with 
industry, which the fi rms hoped might stimulate new uses (and hence markets) for 
their products. For example, the center submitted a 1979 grant application titled “In-
telligent Systems for Music Analysis” under the NSF’s university- industry coopera-
tive research program, proposing to join with the Palo Alto– based machine- control 
fi rm Systems Control. Though Systems Control had no interest in music per se, it 
had much to gain from other applications of the work that happened to employ music 
as a context. Similarly, in 1975 James Angell (an EE faculty member) used money 
from Stanford’s new Research Development Fund, “established to stimulate innova-
tive research endeavors by both junior faculty and faculty who were redirecting their 
research interests” (i.e., faculty interested in adopting the relevant- research agenda), 
to support Moore’s graduate work and to collaborate with Ed Taylor, an engineer at 
EPA Electronics. Moore, Taylor, and Angell then approached Intel, which told them 
“they would be happy to provide us with any amount of the componentry (especially 
integrated circuits) which they make that might be of use to us,” presumably in hopes 
of fi nding new applications for their products.84
80 Chowning, Smith, and Cohen, “Computer Music Facility” (cit. n. 47), 4.
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82 David Kaiser, “Cold War Requisitions, Scientifi c Manpower, and the Production of American 
Physicists after World War II,” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 33 (2002): 131– 59.
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The most far- reaching of CCRMA’s translations—at least in terms of physical 
distance—emerged from its collaborations with NASA. For its part, as early as 
1962, NASA announced that it was “particularly desirous that the environment in 
which space research is conducted will be characterized by a multidisciplinary effort 
which draws upon creative minds from various branches of the sciences, technology, 
commerce and the arts.”85 Indeed, a 1972 NASA- Stanford agreement elicited pro-
posals from “Art History, Genetics, Psychiatry, the Graduate School of Business, 
and Geology.”86 In that light, it is worth noting that there was an active Mars research 
group at the Stanford Artifi cial Intelligence Project, where CCRMA was based for its 
fi rst years. In fact, Mike McNabb, one of CCRMA’s earliest PhD students, composed 
a suite, Music for Mars in 3-D, tied to stereographic images from NASA’s Mars Vi-
king spacecraft. Another of McNabb’s creations, Invisible Cities, was a ballet fea-
turing an automated robot as a dancer and a computer- music soundtrack as the or-
chestra. McNabb’s collaborators on the ballet included both the ODC/ San Francisco 
Dance Company and the Veterans Administration Robotic Aid project, the latter of 
which was experimenting with how to employ robotics to assist injured Vietnam 
veterans.
CONCLUSION
As the other articles in this volume illustrate, music and science have a long common 
history. In this article, we have focused upon the organizational and institutional as-
pects of this relationship in a twentieth- century research university. Specifi cally, we 
have elaborated upon the ways in which Vietnam War– era debates at Stanford (and 
elsewhere) forged a new institutional environment that emphasized radical interdisci-
plinarity and relevant research. Although the activists and interests engaged in these 
discussions maintained signifi cant heterogeneity, an emergent research center that 
was explicitly focused upon the intersection of music and science found both le-
gitimacy and resources in this new environment. In turn, the work conducted at this 
center, in terms of both musical composition and technical advance, has had far- 
reaching impact in a variety of spheres.
Our analysis has focused particular attention on computer- music research methods 
and tools as multivocal technologies that span both disciplinary boundaries and areas 
of applied interest. In this way, the technologies themselves both refl ected and fa-
cilitated the emergent institutional environment at Stanford. Even as Vietnam- era 
debates waned and campus interests turned fi rmly toward Silicon Valley entrepre-
neurship by the close of the century, the generality and fl exibility of computer music 
allowed CCRMA members to orient toward start-up companies and new models of 
university intellectual property. Similarly, as the stigma attached to funding and proj-
ects associated with the military- industrial complex waned from the late ’70s on-
85 “Memorandum of Understanding between National Aeronautics and Space Administration and 
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Administration.”
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ward, CCRMA employed its multivocal research tools to seek funding from the NSA 
and the Offi ce of Naval Research.
Ultimately, our article sheds light upon the ways in which organizational and in-
stitutional arrangements can give rise to and underpin the environments in which 
music and science interact. From this perspective, Chowning’s 1975 description of 
CCRMA’s role—“to provide intellectual ventilation as well as coordination”87—
might be equally apt to describe the role of institutional environments in structuring 
the relationship between music and science as a whole.
87 Hertelendy, “Stanford’s Musical ‘Marriage’ ” (cit. n. 50).
